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Abstract 
 
Decentralization deployed in the last two decades in Greece via two local government 
reforms. Kapodistrias Plan and Kallikrates Project amalgamated successively the huge 
number of 5.775 municipalities and communities into 325 enlarged municipalities, 
institutionalized the 13 regions as second tiers of local government and transferred an 
unparalleled set of rights and powers to municipalities and regions. The 
abovementioned reforms changed the operation of local governments and established 
new conditions for the role of local actors in regional planning.  
 This paper aims to assess the decentralization process in Greece, by taking into 
account the perceptions of local actors. A primary research was held in Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace region, in order to understand the affiliation of local actors to 
the reforms. Results demonstrate that Kapodistrias reform had bigger social 
acceptance than Kallikrates, as economic crisis and rough spatial planning deter the 
effective implementation of the second wave of reforms. Non institutional actors and 
members of societal and cultural organizations perceived more substantially the 
reforms, than institutional actors and non members of local organizations did. Further 
improvements are necessary for the modernization of Greek local governments, in the 
fields of financial decentralization and administrative capacity  
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1. Introduction 
 
Local governments are the prevalent administrative bodies of a territory by 
determining a set of different options in public sphere. After receiving citizen’s 
acceptance through elections, local governments operate in different activities, 
associated with a number of issues like development (Blatter, 2006; Blom-Hansen et 
al, 2012), administrative efficiency (Hankla & Downs, 2010; Kuhlmann & Wollman, 
2011), spatial planning (Lalenis & Liogas, 2002) and advancement of cooperative 
strategies (Bel et al, 2007; Hazakis & Ioannidis, 2014).  
Decentralization is a multidimensional process, consisted by the conveyance 
of different competences from central government to local government units 
(Treisman, 2002; Pollitt, 2005; Ongaro, 2006). The legislative instrument of 
decentralization is local government reforms, as by these statutes local governments 
receive competences to expand their power and to reshape economic and 
administrative space, by generating new conditions for regional governance.  In a 
broader context, the establishment of local government reforms is affected by the 
perceptions of local actors. Local actors can advance or undercut the procedure of 
decentralization by holding implicit structures of power (Jakobsen, 2012). Thereof the 
inquiry of local milieu’s perceptions about devolution of powers and competences to 
local government illuminates the very characteristics of decentralization process.  
The system of local government in Greece experienced unparallel 
modifications in the recent years, by two major reforms, namely Kapodistrias Plan 
(Law 2539/1997) and Kallikrates Project (Law 3852/2010). The amalgamation of 
municipalities and local communities into larger municipalities and the conveyance of 
competences from central state to local government units were the dominant 
characteristics of the reforms. In addition, regions (NUTS II), substituted prefectures 
(NUTS III), in the field of second tier of local government units. These changes apart 
from the rearrangement of the local government map improved the operation 
framework for municipalities and regions and brought into the frontline cooperation 
of local actors as an intangible asset of regional development (Ioannidis, 2014). 
 The aim of this paper is to assess the process of recent local government 
reforms in Greece by taking into account the perceptions of local actors. Case study of 
the research is Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, one of the thirteen regions in Greece. 
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Research was conducted by a closed type questionnaire that was distributed in 
institutional and non institutional actors of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 emphasizes on the 
literature review of decentralization and local government reforms. Section 3, studies 
the local government system in Greece. Section 4 presents the methodology that was 
adopted by the research. Section 5 analyzes the results of the research and Section 6 
summarizes the conclusion of the research.  
 
2. Literature Review 
   
Decentralization is defined by World Bank (2014), as the transfer of authority and 
responsibilities for public functions, from central governments to regional 
governments or quasi-independent government organizations and/or the private 
sector. The devolution of powers to sub-national authorities is a multitude process 
(Dubois & Fattore, 2009), determined by a set of different factors such as territorial 
scale, citizenship and socioeconomic characteristics (Treisman, 2002), and especially 
by institutional arrangements and country characteristics (De Vries, 2000; Politt, 
2005; Marks et al, 2008).  
Devolution of competences and services is consisted by the quietus of central 
government in specific administrative functions and the simultaneous reception of 
these powers by local governments (Hlepas, 1999). This happens for the sake of 
effectiveness, as local governments have the potential to regulate more accurately 
local affairs (Wollman, 2004). Local actors are affected by decentralization, 
wherefore their set of options is now widest: the greater the competences that local 
government units of their territory have, the bigger the domain of their interest is, and 
as a sequence, the more selective their strategies are as they have more powers to 
interplay with local actors by participating in local planning. 
Decentralization was evolved as dominant strategy for the reconstruction of 
state after the economic crisis of the 70’s. The downward compression of public 
expenditures in conjunction with the intense competition from emerging Asian 
markets pushed Western states to convey a set of services to local and regional 
authorities (Piore & Sabel, 1984; Jessop, 1993). As aptly stated by Harvey (1989: 
279) “…decentralization and deconcentration taken together with the cultural concern 
with the qualities of place and space creates a political climate in which the politics of 
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community, place, and region can unfold in new ways”. In other words, 
decentralization and regional renaissance follow parallel routes, showing that the 
enhancement of regional and local authority can be embraced with regional 
development. 
Interaction among local government units and local actors reproduce 
substantial knowledge and information sharing, about local res publica throughout the 
acceptance and implementation of cooperative strategies (Iyer et al, 2005). Two 
critical conditions boost these formations (Ioannidis, 2014): firstly, the necessary 
condition is that local and regional governments ought to have high levels of 
authority, allowing them to shape local socioeconomic environment, and secondly, the 
efficient condition is that local actors have motives to participate and to collaborate in 
local development projects. These progressions favor the establishment of multilateral 
forms of governance. As Piattoni argues (2009:164), “…multi-level governance often 
relies on the creation of ad hoc networks, which may include...legitimately constituted 
deliberative assemblies together with other public and private, individual and 
collective actors”. Multi-level governance is indissolubly directed by local 
government reforms as the interest of local institutional and non institutional actors 
are engaged to local economic milieu. 
Reforms of local governments are pivotal instruments of revitalization of local 
economic, administrative and cultural space (Arsnenault, 2006; Blom-Hansen et al, 
2012). Hereupon local actors become acquainted with local environment, as their 
participation in commons affects more promptly local public policy. Nonetheless, 
local government consolidation is not sine qua non drivers of local economic 
development since are determined by the very special characteristics of the local 
socioeconomic circuit (Carr & Feiock, 1999).  
Under this standpoint, local government reforms have a number of advantages 
and disadvantages. Initially, the transfer of powers from central government to 
municipal and regional government broadens the institutional field of action for 
decentralized units. Local and regional governments are able to improve local living 
standards, by operating in a number of fields like tax collection, local investments and 
exploit of comparative advantages (Davey & Pteri, 2006:595). Concurrently, the 
administrative efficiency of local and regional governments pervades substantially in 
local public sphere whereas social interaction with local actors is strengthen 
(Jakobsen, 2012). Additionally, state’s restructure following the way of conveyance of 
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powers to local and regional administration can be connected more easily with 
development (Kuhlmann et al, 2006). Decentralization, when taking into account local 
characteristics, establishes municipal and regional authorities as dominant actors of 
local environment (Hlepas & Getimis, 2011, Teles, 2014).  
On the other hand, local government reforms might affect negatively local 
interaction. The special constituents of each community i.e. economic, social, cultural 
and administrative judge the successive implementation of reforms, if not weighted 
accurately by the legislator, can decrease the interest of local actors to collaborate 
(Ladner & Fiechter, 2012; Alexander, 2013). This omission entails the persistent 
strategy of central government to regulate local affairs in order to defend its 
bureaucratic interests (Kjaer et al, 2010). Another one factor that can hinder the 
normative process of decentralization is the number of local government units after 
amalgamation. This element is more crucial for the first tier of local government units, 
as the operation of small territory municipalities hamper inter-municipal cooperation 
of local actors and further increase transaction costs (Wollman, 2004; Rusavy & 
Bernard, 2012).  
Apart from the bureaucracy of local government reforms, decentralization is 
determined by the embrace of local actors in its provision, as well.  According to Bell 
et al (2013), the size of municipalities modulates the kind of collaboration and 
interaction among local governments and agents. In bigger territories privatization and 
outsourcing are dominant choices for public service delivery, whereas in smaller 
municipalities cooperative strategies are selected as instruments of scale economies. 
The path dependence that a local government unit has displayed to collaborative 
strategies is also a crucial factor. Informal rules in social behavior, commonly 
accepted beliefs and perceptions, and repeated interaction among agents improve the 
level of social capital and make feasible the adoption of collaborated strategies, that 
advance local welfare (John et al, 2011). Social capital is a critical and simultaneously 
a multilateral determinant in the acceptance of decentralization, by advancing 
intraregional cooperation (Ioannidis, 2013). Except from the formation of trust, 
reciprocity and social networks, cooperation in this case is fostered by the inter-
municipal cooperative strategies (Park, 2005; Feiock, 2007; Tiller & Jakus, 2005),  
and the partnership amid firms and local governments (Cruz & Marquez,2013).  
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3. Local Government System in Greece 
 
Until the execution of Kallikrates reform, local and regional governments in Greece 
did not have crucial competences. Central administration scheduled and implemented 
the majority of associated with local affairs public policies. With some exceptions-see 
for instance Lalenis (2003) about the significance of law 1614 for open cities- local 
government units did not experienced crucial conditions where their intervention was 
something more than necessary. Contra wise municipalities and prefectures 
functioned primarily as structural part of the state and not like self government units. 
As a result, the level of regional authority was not high and Greek municipalities and 
prefectures lagged to manage their own affairs (Getimis & Grigoriadou, 2004). 
Only recently the local government system in Greece faced important 
revitalization. Two successive reforms (Kapodistrias and Kallikrates) reduced the 
huge number of municipalities (5.755 in 1997), substituted prefectures with regions in 
the second level of local government, and conveyed a set of authorities to 
municipalities and regions from central government.  
 
Table 1: Elements of Kapodistrias and Kallikrates Reforms 
 Kapodistrias Reform 
(1998-2010) 
Kallikrates Reform 
(2011-) 
First Tier of Local 
Government 
900 municipalities and 134 
communities 
325 municipalities 
Second Tier of Local 
Government 
52 prefectures 13 regions 
Regional Authority 13 regions 13 regions now second tier of 
local government 
Sort of Election Directly election for mayors, 
presidents of the communities 
and prefects. Appointment of 
regional governors by the state 
Directly election for mayors, 
presidents of the communities 
and regional governors. 
Level of Competences Law level of competences for 
communities, municipalities and 
prefectures. Regional governors 
implement the rule of the state 
High level of competences for 
municipalities and regions. 
Cognitive conditions for local 
actors to participate in the 
commons 
Main Financing Intergovernmental Grants Intergovernmental Grants 
Source: Law 2539/1997, Law 3852/2010 & Ioannidis (2014) 
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Sharply Kapodistrias reform (Law 2539/1997) amalgamated the 5.755 municipalities 
and rural communities into 900 bigger municipalities and 134 enlarged communities, 
but did not upgrade the quiver of competences that merger municipalities and 
communities had. Concerning that the second tier of local government was constituted 
by the 52 prefectures, with low level of competences as well, it can be easily 
understood the complexity of the system and the restraints that municipalities and 
prefectures were confronted. The second step to regionalism took place by the 
implementation of Kallikrates reform (Law 3852/2010). As it can be seen in table 1, 
the new phase in amalgamation process confirmed the number of municipalities to 
325, institutionalized regions as second level of local government and transferred an 
unparalleled set of powers to regions and municipalities.   
Rationally up to Kallikrates reform the engagement of local actors to local 
planning was not influential, as municipalities and prefectures were not motivated to 
interact with them. Decentralization proceeded with slow rates, because central state 
determined the limits of actions for the two tiers of local government (Skamnakis, 
2011). The feebleness of local government units to commit in substantial fields 
maintained the sovereignty of traditional bureaucracy at the expense of innovative 
forms of local planning (Matei & Lazaar, 2011). Despite the modernization that 
Kapodistrias reform caused in Greek local government system, did not devitalized its 
path dependence from central administrative system (Ioannidis, 2014). 
 The abovementioned features gave prominence to the necessity of Kallikrates 
reform (Law 3852/2010). Kallikrates is a more integrated process of decentralization, 
as rearranges the Greek state in favour of local government (Akrivopoulou et al, 
2012). The two more important pillars of the reform are the advancement of local and 
regional authority, and successively the creation of institutional corps like the 
Regional and Municipal Consultation Committees. Local actors have the potential to 
participate in local and regional level by regarding and resolving issues that are 
associated with their interests. Concerning these evolvements, it can be stated that 
Kallikrates’ provisions encapsulate options of urban multilateral governance. 
Howbeilt, Kallikrates did not improve so much the constitution of social capital, 
possibly because was implemented during the great fiscal crisis of Greece (Hazakis & 
Ioannidis, 2014), Moreover the statute did not foresee any improvement in the finance 
of local government units and the main promoter still is the central state throughout 
the process of intergovernmental grants. 
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 To summarize, Kapodistrias and Kallikrates reforms reorganized, not only the 
Greek local government scheme, but also the Greek administrative system as a total. 
Under this perspective, it is necessary to study the perceptions of local actors in a 
Greek region, in order to comprehend more accurately the effects that the two reforms 
generated in local economic space.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1 The Region of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 
 
Eastern Macedonia and Thrace is a border region, located in the north-eastern part of 
Greece. After the implementation of Kallikrates reform the five prefecture of Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace, explicitly Drama, Evros, Kavala, Rodopi and Xanthi, renamed 
as regional units  
 
 
 
Figure1: Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Region 
Source: Regional Government of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Website 
 
 Table 2 depicts the number of first tier of local government in Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace during Kapodistrias and Kallikrates reform. 
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Table 2: Number of Municipalities and Communities in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 
 Kapodistrias Reform Kallikrates Reform 
Drama 8 municipalities and 1 community 5 municipalities 
Evros  13 municipalities 5 municipalities 
Kavala 13 municipalities 4municipalities 
Xanthi 6 municipalities and 4 communities 4 municipalities 
Rodopi 9 municipalities and 3 communities 4 municipalities 
Total 49 municipalities and 8 communities 22 municipalities 
Source: Law 2539/1997, Law 3852/2010 & Ioannidis (2014) 
 
Drama and Evros have 5 municipalities after the latest reform, whereas Kavala, 
Xanthi and Rodopi have four. Drama faced the most minor reduction of its 
municipalities, whereas Kavala the bigger. Totally the 49 municipalities and 8 
communities of the region amalgamated into 22 enlarged municipalities. 
According to Eurostat’s regional accounts (2014), Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace is a lagged region as regional per capita income sizes less than the 75% of the 
mean of European Union. It should also be notified that according to recent data, per 
capita income in the five regional units of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace corresponds 
approximately to the 70.09% of the mean per capita income in Greece (Hellenic 
Statistical Authority, 2014).  In prices of 2012, Kavala has the biggest per capital 
income, among the five regional units of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, and Drama 
has the lowest. Per capita income of Evros’ residents is slightly more than the regional 
average, but per capita income in Xanthi and Rodopi is below this index. 
 
Table 3: Per Capita Income of Regional Unities in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 
 per capita income per capital income as % of 
average per capita income of 
Greece 
Drama 10.767 61.5% 
Evros 12.724 72.68% 
Kavala 14.148 80.81% 
Xanthi 11.606 66.29% 
Rodopi 11.321 64.67% 
Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace 
12.270 70.09% 
Source: Hellenic Statistical Authority 
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4.2 The Questionnaire 
 
Methodology employed primary research in order to study the perceptions that 
actors of Easter Macedonia and Thrace formed about the two recent reforms of local 
government. Reforms of local government are considered as basic instruments of 
decentralization. 
A closed type questionnaire was distributed to local actors of Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace via post or e-mail.  Overall 245 queries were selected, 
providing to the research a response rate equal to 48.32%.  The questionnaire was 
scheduled by following a set of previous studies that focused on the broader 
association among local government reforms and perceptions of local actors (Krishna 
& Uphoff, 1999; Ha & Feiock, 2011; Park; 2005 Alexander, 2013; Falleth and 
Hansen, 2013). 
The questions adjusted to the directions and provisions that Kapodistrias and 
Kallikrates reforms introduced to the two tiers of local governments in Greece and the 
questionnaire was divided into three main parts. The first part focuses on the planning 
terms of the reforms, the second on the impact that reforms exercised on social capital 
and the third on the respective influence that was exerted on the local governments’ 
operation. The choice to put common questions for the two different statutes 
permitted research to compare and to extract robust conclusions.  
The sample was divided into two categories, namely institutional and non 
institutional actors. The ensemble of institutional actors was comprised by public 
servants of local and regional administration, head officials of professional and 
scientific units and board of directors in societal and cultural organizations. The other 
group of the sample was constituted by active actors of Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace in different professional occupations i.e. employees in private sector, self 
employed and entrepreneurs.  In the first case the sample selection was defined by the 
limits of the five regional units of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace and had the 
characteristics of convenience sample. In the second case the sample was collected 
randomly, so to be compared the perceptions of the two groups. Steinacker’s research 
(2002) featured the significant role of institutional actors in local planning, while 
Blatter (2006), notified that the cognitive transfer of competences pass through 
institutional actors. 
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 In addition, the participants in the research were asked about their affiliation 
with local cultural and societal organization. This selection took place randomly so as 
to estimate the association among networking and perception of local government 
reforms. Previous studies have shown that networking improves the levels of social 
capital (Knack & Keefer, 1997; Iyer et al, 2005), as cultural and societal 
characteristics determine the acceptance of local government reforms (Arsenault, 
2006;), but Ladner & Fiechter (2012) proved that the conveyance of powers to local 
governments from central governments, do not improve essentially local cooperative 
culture.  
Table 4 informs about the sample characteristics, due to institutional role and 
participation in local cultural and societal organizations. The more participants in the 
research had an institutional role during Kallikrates period, whilst relatively lesser are 
the respondents with institutional role during Kapodistrias reform (46.53% to 
53.47%). Participants in societal and cultural organizations are the majority group for 
the two reforms (53.47% and 55.41% respectively), and are relatively more for 
Kallikrates period. 
 
Table 4: Sample Characteristics due to Institutional Role and Membership in Societal and Cultural 
Organizations 
 Kapodistrias 
Period 
Kallikrates 
Period 
Institutional Actor 46.53% 53.47% 
Participation in Societal and Cultural 
Organizations 
53.47% 55.41% 
 
 
Apart from institutional role, and membership in local societal and cultural 
organizations, research studied the spatial dimension of reforms’ perceptions. 
Relevant studies had research the complex association among local government 
reforms and local space (De Ceuninck et al, 2010; Wollman, 2010; Rusavy & 
Bernard, 2012). Table 3 illustrates the spatial distribution of the sample into Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace region. 
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Table 5: Response rate of each regional unity in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace 
 Number of 
questionnaires 
sent 
Number of 
questionnaires 
answered 
Response  
Rate 
% of 
participation 
to the 
research 
% of population 
in Eastern 
Macedonia and 
Thrace  
Drama 92 68 73.91 27,8 18.1 
Evros 124 45 36.29 18,4 24.4 
Kavala 105 50 47.61 20,4 20.91 
Xanthi 94 47 50 19,2 18.49 
Rodipi 92 35 38.04 14,3 18.1 
 
 
Comparing these characteristics with the relative results of 2011 Census, some 
sampling bias is observed. Specifically, minor deviations were considered in gender, 
where women were slightly under-presented. In declinations were appeared in the 
education variable, as participants in the research are over-qualified. As regards the 
spatial distribution of the population, Drama is over-presented while Rodopi and 
Evros are under-presented. These distortions are associated with the distribution of 
human capital in the local and regional administration of Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace.  
The basic limitation of the research was that actors were asked to assess also 
the previous state in local and regional government (Kapodistrias Plan) during the 
implementation of the new reform (Kallikrates Project). Research tried to overcome 
this trammel, by incorporating questions about the negative options of the two 
reforms, in order to allow participants to express more roughly their perceptions. 
Moreover, the research had difficulties to divide the sample into institutional and non 
institutional actors, taking into account the response rate of each regional unity. 
Nonetheless, the distribution of queries to institutional and non institutional actors 
proceeded due to the first column of table 5.   
 
5. Results 
 
In the next tables the results of the empirical research are depicted. Table 6 portrays 
the main results about the planning of the two reforms and the respective influence 
that exercised on social capital and local government operation.  In addition, the 
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correlation between the two reforms is studied by taking into account the perceptions 
of local actors.  
 As regards, the planning process, Kallikrates reform achieved significant 
economies of scale. Kapodistrias’ planning considered more substantially the 
historical background of the settlements, and interestingly transferred more effectively 
the competences to municipalities. The persistent economic crisis acted as a deterrent 
for the implementation of Kallikrates, whereas political expediencies were not 
negligible in the planning of the two reforms.  
Concerning social capital results denote a more cognitive affiliation of local 
actors in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace with Kapodistrias reform. Extensively, the 
first reform improved more the cooperation among non governmental organizations 
(N.G.O.) and local cultural-societal organizations and the citizen’s participation in 
N.G.O. and local cultural-societal organizations, but however not in high levels. On 
the contrary, Kallikrates reform compounded relatively more the complaints of local 
actors about the amalgamations of municipalities and emerged debates about localism. 
Furthermore, volunteerism did not accept major influence by the two reforms.  
The last sessions of the questionnaire captured the field of local government. 
Investment projects for local welfare that was held by municipalities and local 
policies for local welfare, associated rather with Kapodistrias than Kallikrates reform. 
No significant deviations were found in the other three variables of the local 
government operation.  
Kapodistrias and Kallikrates reform are connected with significant path 
dependence. The correlation coefficient in the most variables of the questionnaire 
exceeds 0.4 and in a lot of cases is bigger than 0.5. In contrast, the correlation 
between the two reforms was moderately low for two variables: economic crisis and 
citizens’ complaints in disestablished municipalities. These findings, combined with 
the above mentioned results, indicate that Kallikrates’ implementation is directly 
connected with economic crisis and moreover that the spatial amalgamations of 
municipalities did not enjoy the acceptance of local actors.  
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Table 6: Average Scores for Kapodistrias and Kallikrates Reform 
 Kapodistrias 
 
Kallikrates 
 
t-test 
(3) 
Correlation 
(4) (1)-(2) 
Mean (1) St.dev Mean (2) Stdev 
Planning 
Economies of scale 3,02 1.24 3,36 1.21 4,389* 0,547* 
Political Expediencies 3,6 1.3 3,66 1.22 0,878 0,671* 
Historical Background of settlements 2,59 1.13 2,33 1.03 -3,506* 0,465* 
Effective transfer of competences 2,38 1.07 2,16 1.06 -3,008* 0,436* 
Influence of economic crisis 2,62 1.41 3,74 1.45 9,573* 0,197* 
Social Capital 
Cooperation among N.G.O. and local cultural-societal organizations 2,88 1.12 2,75 1.13 -1,915*** 0,567* 
Citizen’s participation in N.G.O. and local cultural-societal 
organizations 
2,41 1.21 2,22 1.12 -2,597** 0,554* 
Citizen’s volunteerism  2,64 1.13 2,58 1.19 -0,801 0,592* 
Emergence of old debates among localities 3,09 1.22 3,17 1.21 1,78*** 0,537* 
Citizen’s complaints in disestablished municipalities 3,18 1.18 3,35 1.25 1,768*** 0,304* 
Local Government Operation 
Cooperation among central government and tiers of local 
governments 
2,77 0.96 2,75 1.09 -0,339 0,576* 
Cooperation among regional government (second tier) 2,44 0.96 2,5 1.04 0,919 0,51* 
Investment projects for local welfare 2,74 1.13 2,45 1.1 -4,038* 0,522* 
Local policies for local welfare 2,8 1.17 2,61 1.19 -3,157* 0,689* 
Research and innovation projects 2,22 1.03 2,18 1.06 -0,584 0,545* 
Note:  *, **, *** significance at the 0.01, 0.05 & 0.1 level 
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4.1 Intraregional Distribution of Results 
 
The two following tables focus on the spatial dimension of local actors’ perceptions. 
For Kapodistrias reform, differences were found in five variables, i.e. two for social 
capital and local government operation and one for planning. The respondents from 
regional unity of Evros supported more the transfer of competences from central 
government to municipalities, whilst stated that citizens’ participation, volunteerism 
and research innovation projects by local government upgraded during the first 
reform. In parallel, the respondents from regional unity of Xanthi argued that local 
policies for local welfare were improved comparatively more to the residents of the 
other four regional units.  
For Kallikrates reform, the intraregional deviations of local perceptions stood 
roughly speaking at the same level. One statistically difference observed for planning 
and one for social capital as well, whereas two were remarked for local government 
operation. Deviations in the effective transfer of competences were designated by 
residents of Kavala, but respondents living in Komotini, the capital of Eastern 
Macedonia and Thrace, denoted that cooperation among regional government 
enhanced by the second reform. On the other side of the spectrum, residents of Evros 
stated that Kallikrates reform emerged debates among localities, but slowed the two 
tiers of local governments to implement local welfare policies. 
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Table 7: Intraregional Distribution of Results: Kapodistrias Reform 
  
  
Drama Evros Kavala Xanthi Rodopi Levene 
test 
F 
statistic 
Planning variables 
Economies of scale 3,15 3,19 2,98 3 2,71 2,143*** 0,915 
Political Expediencies 3,67 3,71 3,66 3,48 3,43 0,113 0,394 
Historical Perspectives of settlements 2,62 2,64 2,48 2,66 2,57 0,818 0,189 
Effective transfer of competences 3,67 3,71 3,66 3,48 3,43 1,632 4,607* 
Influence of economic crisis 2,85 2,73 2,58 2,27 2,57 0,918 1,114 
Β 
Cooperation among N.G.O. and local 
cultural-societal organizations 2,73 2,89 2,92 2,98 2,97 1,184 0,429 
Citizen’s participation in N.G.O. and 
local cultural-societal organizations 2,17 2,58 2,44 2,75 2,16 1,513 2,118*** 
Citizen’s volunteerism  2,35 2,8 2,76 2,89 2,49 1,663 2,113*** 
Emergence of old debates among 
localities 3,1 3,09 3,1 3 2,79 0,754 0,436 
Citizen’s complaints in disestablished 
municipalities 3,4 3,09 3,28 3,11 2,89 1,119 1,293 
  
Cooperation among central government 
and tiers of local governments 2,74 2,84 3 2,68 2,54 1,58 1,371 
Cooperation among regional 
government (second tier) 2,45 2,63 2,42 2,38 2,3 2,938** 0,616 
Investment projects for local welfare 2,48 2,87 2,61 3 2,94 0,709 1,96 
Local policies for local welfare 
2,47 3,02 2,55 3,24 3 3,415** 4,160*** 
Research and innovation projects 1,72 2,47 2,46 2,33 2,35 2,056*** 5,718** 
Note:  *, **, *** significance at the 0.01, 0.05 & 0.1 level 
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Table 8: Intraregional Distribution of Results: Kallikrates Reform 
  
  
Drama Evros Kavala Xanthi Rodopi Levene 
test 
F 
statistic 
 
Economies of scale 3,42 3,55 3,36 3,28 3,06 0,661 0,886 
Political Expediencies 3,72 3,76 3,56 3,68 3,43 1,87 0,49 
Historical Perspectives of settlements 2,07 1,69 2,47 2,34 2,37 2,418** 0,113 
Effective transfer of competences 2,07 1,69 2,47 2,34 2,37 2,381*** 4,013* 
Influence of economic crisis 3,93 3,87 3,8 3,74 3,23 2,732* 1,569 
Β 
Cooperation among N.G.O. and local 
cultural-societal organizations 2,77 2,55 2,68 2,79 2,91 1,339 0,587 
Citizen’s participation in N.G.O. and local 
cultural-societal organizations 2,25 2,14 1,96 2,34 2,35 2,311*** 0,98 
Citizen’s volunteerism  2,45 2,71 2,64 2,64 2,43 1,762 0,511 
Emergence of old debates among 
localities 2,88 3,58 3,22 3,26 2,91 1,303 2,733** 
Citizen’s complaints in disestablished 
municipalities 3,31 3,67 3,4 3,06 3,14 0,529 1,577 
  
Cooperation among central government 
and tiers of local governments 2,73 2,6 2,86 2,77 2,71 1,179 0,329 
Cooperation among regional government 
(second tier) 2,61 2,4 2,26 2,49 2,91 1,54 2,233*** 
Investment projects for local welfare 2,42 2,73 2,16 2,36 2,6 3,256** 0,683 
Local policies for local welfare 
2,34 2,78 2,45 2,76 2,76 2,501** 2,477** 
Research and innovation projects 1,88 2,33 2,24 2,18 2,44 5,815* 0,901 
Note:  *, **, *** significance at the 0.01, 0.05 & 0.1 level 
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4.2 Institutional Dimension of Results 
 
Table 9 portrays the responses of local actors due to their institutional or non 
institutional role, as noted in the methodology section. For both reforms minor 
significant differences associated with the non institutional role of local actors were 
found.  
For Kapodistrias reform, non institutional actors assessed that the institutional 
arrangements respected the historical background of amalgamated communities and 
municipalities. In addition, the members of this group argued that Kapodistrias reform 
was connected more successfully with investment projects form local welfare and 
local policies for local welfare. Apart from the aforementioned deviations, it is 
notable that in the eight of the twelve other variables of the questionnaire, non 
institutional actors perceived more essentially the reform than institutional actors did. 
At length, institutional actors dwelled on political expediencies, economic crisis and 
citizen’s complaints, and in contrast, on the importance of volunteerism.  
This is also the case for Kallikrates reform since non institutional actors stated 
that cooperation among N.G.O. and local cultural-societal organizations was 
significantly advanced. Moreover, this group of respondents denoted that the second 
wave of local government reforms emerged old debates among localities. Regarding 
the role of non institutional actors in Kallikrates’ perception, turns out findings that 
concern the importance of political expediencies in reform’s planning, but also the 
enhancement of citizen’s volunteerism and the cooperation of regional governments. 
Nevertheless, none of these deviations are significant due to the t-test. 
Results display that non institutional actors perceived rather more substantially 
the importance of the two reforms, than institutional actors did.  Informal actions of 
citizenship are associated with a broadest perspective in local res publica. On the 
other hand, the abstemious stance of institutional actors might be corollary of their 
intrinsic information to the planning and implementation terms of the two reforms.  
 
 19 
Table 9: Institutional Dimension of Results 
 Kapodistrias Reform Kallikrates Reform 
 Institutional 
Actor 
Non  
Institutional 
Actor 
t-test 
 
Institutional 
Actor 
Non  
Institutional 
Actor 
t-test 
 
Economies of scale 3,02 3,04 0.124 3.3 3.41 0.698 
Political Expediencies 3.65 3.56 -0.51 3.6 3.69 -0.545 
Historical Background of settlements 2.4 2.75 2.403* 2.26 2.43 1.262 
Effective transfer of competences 2.35 2.4 0.345 2.06 2.41 1.793 
Influence of economic crisis 2.76 2.51 -1.345 3.85 3.65 1.091 
 
Cooperation among N.G.O. and local cultural-societal organizations 2.81 2.95 0.946 2.54 2.94 2.732* 
Citizen’s participation in N.G.O. and local cultural-societal 
organizations 
2.24 2.55 1.971 2.16 2.25 0.597 
Citizen’s volunteerism  2.7 2.59 -0.732 2.61 2.53 -0.482 
Emergence of old debates among localities 3.01 3.06 0.288 3.03 3.29 1.669*** 
Citizen’s complaints in disestablished municipalities 3.22 3.16 -0.406 3.32 3.33 0.08 
 
Cooperation among central government and tiers of local 
governments 
2.69 2.84 1.115 2.61 2.87 1.885 
Cooperation among regional government (second tier) 2.43 2.45 0.117 2.61 2.42 -1.419 
Investment projects for local welfare 2.27 2.57 1.815** 2.36 2.53 1.161 
Local policies for local welfare 2.63 2.95 2.096** 2.49 2.68 1.224 
Research and innovation projects 2.1 2.32 1.577 2.14 2.11 0.559 
Note:  *, **, *** significance at the 0.01, 0.05 & 0.1 level 
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4.3 Networking Effects 
 
Networking effects of local actors’ perceptions were tested by the use of a 
dichotomous variable. Participants in the research were asked if during Kapodistrias 
(1998-2010), and Kallikrates (2011-ongoing) reforms were members of a societal or 
cultural organization operating in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace. 
 For Kapodistias reform, networking allowed local actors to estimate the 
importance of scale economies, but also the role of political expediencies in planning 
process. Clearly, in the field of social capital, participation in societal and cultural 
organizations gave prominence to the understanding of reform’s provisions that 
concern not only cooperative strategies, but conflict issues as well.  Interestingly, only 
the cooperation among N.G.O. and local cultural-societal organizations did not 
displayed significant difference between the two groups. Nonetheless, in the field of 
local government operation, results followed relatively similar paths as only one 
variable was revealed more by respondents with no participation in local 
organizations, namely the cooperation among regional governments.  
  For Kallikrates reform, results are not so distinctive. In planning variables, 
networking permit local actors of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace to recognize more 
promptly the negative influence of economic crisis. In the field of social capital, two 
variables were distinguished, one with positive dimension (citizenship’s volunteerism) 
and one with negative (emergence of old debates among localities). Similarly, no 
significant deviations were observed in the field of local government operation. 
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Table 10: Networking Dimension of Results 
 Kapodistrias Reform Kallikrates Reform 
 Participation Non  
Participation 
t-test 
 
Participation Non  
Participation 
t-test 
 
Economies of scale 3.18 2.85 -2.024* 3.54 3.1 -2.854 
Political Expediencies 3.73 3.46 -1.628*** 3.68 3.61 -0.447 
Historical Background of settlements 2.55 2.64 0.623 2.28 2.42 1.072 
Effective transfer of competences 2.41 2.34 -0.479 2.13 2.24 0.822 
Influence of economic crisis 2.73 2.5 -1.177 3.91 3.56 -1.917** 
 
Cooperation among N.G.O. and local cultural-societal organizations 2.98 2.76 -1.503 2.72 2.75 0.245 
Citizen’s participation in N.G.O. and local cultural-societal 
organizations 
2.54 2.26 -1.772*** 2.29 2.09 -1.381 
Citizen’s volunteerism  2.85 2.41 -3.054* 2.76 2.33 -2.825* 
Emergence of old debates among localities 3.17 2.87 -1.917*** 3.3 2.97 -2.101** 
Citizen’s complaints in disestablished municipalities 3.37 2.98 -2.515** 3.39 3.25 -0.855 
 
Cooperation among central government and tiers of local 
governments 
2.83 2.71 -0.888 2.83 2.62 -1.422 
Cooperation among regional government (second tier) 2.39 2.5 0.928 2.51 2.53 0.151 
Investment projects for local welfare 2.85 2.62 -1.519 2.47 2.4 -0.525 
Local policies for local welfare 2.9 2.7 -1.274 2.68 2.46 -1.397 
Research and innovation projects 2.25 2.18 -0518 2.25 2.07 -1.302 
Note:  *, **, *** significance at the 0.01, 0.05 & 0.1 level 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Decentralization in Greece deployed significantly via the two recent local government 
reforms. Kapodistrias Plan and Kallikrates Project induced major improvements in 
Greek local governments, in the terms spatial planning, social capital and local 
governments operation. The former reform focused mainly on the spatial restructuring 
of the country, by reducing approximately to the one fifth the units of first local 
government tier. The latter, apart from the further amalgamation of municipalities into 
enlarged municipalities, institutionalized regions as units of second local government 
tier and transferred a wide set of powers to municipalities and regions.  
 The two local government reforms contributed to the substantial 
modernization of the state, by upgrading the role of local governments in regional 
planning process. Municipalities managed to handle effectively local affairs and to 
operate in a more flexible environment. Regions can anymore participate in local 
development projects, by being more independent to central government. Local actors 
adopted more rights as they have the responsibility to elect regional governors and to 
cooperate with local administrative bodies. 
 The research that took place in Eastern Macedonia and Thrace region, in order 
to comprehend the perceptions of local actors anent to Kapodistrias and Kallikrates 
reforms, revealed significant findings. According to the responses, the first reform 
connected more with socioeconomic strategies of municipalities and societal activities 
of local actors, whilst the second focused on efficiency and large economies of scale. 
The relatively moderate level of local actors’ responses corresponds to the respective 
findings of Alexander’s research (2013), about municipal reforms in Australia.  
Interestingly, non institutional actors perceived rather more profoundly the 
improvements in local governments operation, than institutional agents did. This 
finding is in accordance with Steinacker’s research (2002), concerning the 
institutional impediments in local governments’ cooperation.  Nonetheless, the 
institutional role of local actors is a crucial parameter in connecting effective decision 
making and regional planning with local development (Krishna & Uphoff, 1999; 
Blatter, 2006). 
Members of social and cultural organizations joined their activities with the 
provisions of Kapodistrias Plan and Kallikrates Project. In fact, networking was 
associated with the functional perception of reforms and the concomitant affiliation in 
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cooperative practices. As argued by Arsenault (2006), the broadest cultural-societal 
environment influences positively the acceptance of local government reforms. 
Ladner & Fiechter (2012), proved that the transfer of competences from central 
government to local governments do not per se advance the level of cooperative 
culture. Taking into account that the level of social capital improved more during 
Kapodistrias reform, it can be stated that Kallikrates reform did not improved 
significantly the cooperative strategies of local actors in Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace.  
As regards, the intraregional distribution of results, the minor differences that 
were observed gave prominence to a cognitive acceptance of reforms primarily by 
citizens of Evros. Evros is, in the course of per capita income, among the five regional 
units of Eastern Macedonia and Thrace and has in unison with Drama five more 
municipalities. Results of other studies denote that there is no direct linear association 
between the range of geographical space of municipalities and the effectiveness of 
local government units (Wollman, 2004; De Ceuninck et al, 2010; Rusavy & Bernard, 
2012).  
 In a broader context, it can be stated that decentralization in Greece was 
determined by plexus of institutional, economic, societal and cultural factors. This 
argument follows the path of previous studies (Treisman, 2002; Politt, 2005; Marks et 
al, 2008; Dubois & Fattore, 2009), but contributes to the research by revealing the 
negative influence of economic crisis in the acceptance of local government reforms 
by local actors. As notified by the participants of the research, economic crisis enact 
as a deterrent to the procession of Kallikrates reform. Accounting for the importance 
Kallikrates’ reform provisions i.e. institutionalization of regions as second tiers of 
local government, significant transfer of powers from central government to 
municipalities and regions, turns out the finding that economic and financial 
environment affects crucially the decentralization process. On the other hand, this 
finding reveals the financial restraints that the two tiers of local governments confront. 
The reduction in the amounts of intergovernmental grants to municipalities (Ministry 
of Internal Affairs, 2013) compressed local economic activity and weaken the motive 
for local actors to cooperate, as institutional actors were compelled to manage 
Kallikrates reform with much less financial resources (Hazakis & Ioannidis, 2014).  
Even so, decentralization in Greece is a continuous process as proved by the 
values that correlation index received. Therefore, some further improvements are 
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necessary. Besides the enhancement of financial autonomy for both tiers of local 
governments, the upgrade of administrative capacity of regions can advance the terms 
of intraregional cooperation. Under this perspective, regions and municipalities will 
adopt the power to collect their resources and sequentially to invest them in efficient 
operations. 
 For a lagged region, like Eastern Macedonia and Thrace, this context has 
crucial consequence as puts forth the significance of intraregional cooperation in the 
effective handling of decentralization. Intraregional cooperation can act as a unique 
intangible asset, that joins the different interests of local actors to commonly accepted 
strategies. Municipal and regional governments ought to have in this framework a 
principal role in order to affect and to be affected by decentralization. 
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